Abstract. From what moment should we consider the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens as valid?
Introduction
In the Political Science profession reflectivity is a virtue which runs from the abstract call for selfawareness regarding research ontologies, to taking cognizance of our methodological biases, and goes all the way to the intricate details of our analyses, such as how we delineate cases of certain events that can be compared to prove or disprove explanations within a scholarly debate. Experts on periodization remind us that while some episodes of interest seem contained in their occurrence and lend themselves to straightforward examination and comparison, other episodess have debatable boundaries (Clemens 2007) .
As Tilly (2001) once said, "analysts chop continuous streams of social life into episodes according to contentions of their own making"; thus, the need to be clear about what we make into an event.
When it comes to say when a state enfranchised its nationals abroad, experts have different takes, sometimes comparing cases where the implementation of enfranchisement was immediate (e.g. El Salvador) with others in which it lagged for as long as 15 years (e.g. Brazil). This is not a minor issue, because political rights are the most central attribute that distinguishes citizenship from non-citizenship -or in some cases, nationality from citizenship (see Pedroza and Palop, 2017) . The enfranchisement of emigrants is considered to be a correlate of democratization processes (see this journal's special volume on external voting rights published in 2015). Yet, some studies highlight how the external vote has also been instrumentalized by authoritarian regimes, notably in North Africa (Brand 2006) or in regressions to authoritarianism as a measure by elites to remain in power, such as in contemporary Hungary (Bozoki 2013; Pogonyi 2015) or Turkey. In any case, lengthy lags in protracted enfranchisement reforms are so obvious to some scholars that they have suggested there is a political intentionality behind those delays (G. E. Emmerich and Carrera Barroso 2016; Caramani and Grotz 2015) , as these lags suggest a cheap move to grant rights only to stop short of their implementation. A non-implemented enfranchisement is thus not really comparable to a fully implemented one, yet the fuzziness in the literature about nonimplemented cases has led them to be considered positive or negative, and to datasets on several or many cases which have quite different time references to mark enfranchisement.
For scholars working qualitatively on separate cases, it might be clear that some processes of enfranchisement take time to fully develop, but what explains that some processes reach a generous enfranchisement reform at once, while others get stuck after initial steps? This is a question that can only be answered by comparative research. It is relevant because these reforms are taken as markers of larger processes of regime change, but in fact researchers might be referring to quite different stages of it. If we are able to differentiate the key stages involved, this will allow us to test explanations for enfranchisement on a truly common ground. More than that, differentiating between the different stages -the very lag-may reveal a substantial difference between a fully-fledged extension of a right to exercise citizenship and a symbolic policy with no effects and no practicability. Some studies have suggested that some enfranchisement reforms restrict the scope of electoral rights step-wisely at the stages of regulation and application, for instance, by defining that polling stations only open in a handful of countries of apply stringent voting methods (Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015) .
More than fuzziness, the bigger problem that lurks in the shadows is that a process with duration is being mistaken for a punctual event. As a well-known expert of periodization warned, "duration has powerful implications for measurement […] events with duration must be carefully conceptualized and the meaning of their duration understood" (Abbott 1984, 196) . Dealing with this confusion has led us to grasp enfranchisement as processes with a variety of path dependencies and duration.
In this paper we do not address the question of why states enfranchise their citizens abroad (which has gathered substantial attention in the scholarly community). Rather, we ask why processes of enfranchisement lag. We explore whether a lag is aleatory or whether it follows a pattern, we explain what differentiates states that delayed the regulation and application of the external franchise from other countries that regulated and implemented external voting provisions at once. Furthermore, we also consider if there is a relationship between the lag and the output of the regulation and application of external voting. With data collected for a whole world region (22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean), we thus (1) conceptualize the three stages of enfranchisement, (2) demonstrate that these exist, (3) elaborate a classification that allows us to separate the different possible stages of enfranchisement, grasping whether their lagged nature obeys to institutional design or to other reasons, (4) develop hypotheses regarding the reasons for the lag and (5) develop case studies to test them.
THREE STAGES OF NON-RESIDENT ENFRANCHISEMENT
The conceptualization of external enfranchisement as a one-time event is common in the literature about external voting. Scholars usually signal only one point in time to refer to external voting rights approval, and quickly move on to the reasons for adoption. There are some exceptions: in a pioneer contribution, Calderón Chelius differentiated between the approval of external voting rights in Latin America and the "actual state" of legislation, thereby leaving room to specify if further legislation was needed, or if only the application was pending (2003, (41) (42) (43) . In that year, out of 11 countries which she registered as having approved external franchise, 6 had not put it into practice, stuck in a process of further regulation before implementation. Implicitly, Calderón Chelius was distinguishing between approval, regulation and application, without spelling them out. Escobar (2007, 58) , who studied the timing, sequence, and form in which major Latin American sending countries allowed dual citizenship and extended political rights to their nationals abroad, explained variations as a product firstly of timing, dimension and profile of emigration from each country and, secondly, of the historical relationship between the state and its citizens, including political and electoral systems. Combining a cross-sectional with a longitudinal view of selected cases, she simplified the problem of stuck enfranchisement processes by distinguishing between formal legislation and first electoral participation. However, her two-stage distinction hid the character of the formal legislation (i.e. what it consisted of and was it a result of). Although in her case studies she did refer to different causes that could have caused a gap, she did not problematize the gap in her crosssectional analysis. Lafleur, looking to solve the puzzle of low participation of emigrants in 7 Latin American countries by analyzing the restrictions to the franchise, overcame the riddle of referring to stages of enfranchisement in an even simpler way, by registering the year of 1 st democratic external voting experience (2015, 850) .
Instead of doing away with the issue, we propose to understand why it is complex. It is not only the mere duration of enfranchisement that matters, but also, as Abbott would put it, "the quality of those temporal extensions that differs substantively" (1984, 196) . The adoption of external electoral rights is a process composed of three main stages. The first stage (t1) is the 'enactment' of the electoral rights, which usually requires an amendment of the electoral law or/and of the Constitution. Enactment requires that political elites agree on the importance (and perhaps more accurately, the convenience) of enfranchising non-residents abroad.
Enactment is the stage on which most of the studies about external enfranchisement focus (e.g.
Rhodes and
Harutyunyan 2010) and understandably so. It is at this point when legislators extend voting rights in general but also tend to make important decisions that shape the scope of external franchise, namely, which electoral rights are going to be recognized to non-residents (i.e. active and/or passive and for which elections).
The second necessary step for the adoption of external electoral rights is 'regulation' (t2). It includes all the secondary law-making needed in order to hold elections outside the territorial boundaries of the states of origin. It comprises rules regarding the inclusion of non-resident in the electoral rolls, the definition of voting methods, modes of representation, polling stations and even the rules for political competition abroad. This stage is crucial because it defines the contours of the external electoral system abroad and, therefore, the restrictiveness of external electoral rights. In this stage a government can decide the polling stations' number and location (e.g. by geographic or demographic criteria), thereby restrict significantly the number of non-residents eligible to participate in elections. The Bolivian government did this in 2009 when it restricted external voting to only four cities in the world: Madrid, Buenos Aires, São
Paulo and New York (Hinojosa, Domenech, and Lafleur 2012) .
Finally, the third stage, the adoption of external enfranchisement (t3), marks readiness for implementation when the corresponding electoral authority calls emigrants to cast a ballot from abroad for homeland elections for the first time.
Our point is not only to reiterate that external franchise is only completely adopted when all three consecutive stages are in place. The point we want to make is that the dynamics of lagged processes might be different. The external franchise recognizes and enables the access of a new population to exercise power through the vote, but enfranchisement processes vary: some are punctual, while others are protracted. We think this might be related to the very process of political change in which these enfranchisements are embedded. It is possible that a change in the political setting that initially led to the enactment of external franchise leads to a delay or even to a full stop in the process of enfranchisement in the regulation or the implementation stages, as in cases when a government comes into office with the foreseeable task of implementing the external vote but decides to delay or stop the process due to a perceived lack of support from external voters. All in all, we argue that the adoption of the external franchise is a dynamic process that needs to be analyzed as such. Table 2 shows the adoption of external passive electoral rights in the region. There are 12 countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) that eliminated the requirement of in-country residence to participate in elections in general (i.e. not specifying the kinds of passive electoral rights upon enactment). However, only five have regulated and applied passive electoral rights. For those countries that have, we observe the same lags as for active electoral rights. Remarkably, the countries that have regulated and applied external passive voting rights are also those with overall shorter process of active external voting adoption. 
EXPLAINING EXTERNAL ENFRANCHISEMENT AS A PROCESS: Hypotheses
Addressing processes, yet they have some limitations when it comes to setting clear frames for comparison. Although some of these authors make reference to the "timing" of the extension of rights and even to a delay with regard to the first implementation of elections abroad, they do not engage with the different stages. By analyzing enfranchisement as a process, we do not only engage with its stages, but -as we will clarify below-also bring more variation into their dependent variable.
Franchise extensions are embedded in larger processes of political change. Their being whole or truncated reveals something about those processes. In other words, with regard to democratization processes, we expect to find an effect on length of enfranchisement. We hypothesize that the countries that introduced external franchise in advanced stages of democratization processes will have shorter nonresident enfranchisement processes than the countries that introduce external voting before, or in early stages of, democratization (H1). This is because the broad political and societal consultation and general extensions of rights promoted by democratization decreases the probability of politicizing external voting after enactment, allowing a much faster process of external enfranchisement.
On a second level, we find it plausible that the length of the process of the external enfranchisement is affected by the legal procedure used to enact external voting (H2). We see three main possibilities. The first is the enactment via referendum in which citizens decided whether or not they support the extension of franchise to non-residents. The second is that external electoral rights are part and parcel of a newly enacted constitution, as it usually occurs in (regime) foundational moments in a democratization scenario. Finally, external franchise can be introduced as the result of an ordinary constitutional amendment or a new electoral law carried out by the legislative power. We hypothesize that the length of external enfranchisement varies depending on these enfranchisement routes, as each allows more or less lags to develop. We propose that the route is faster when external voting is the result of a direct popular demand via referendum (H2a). In this scenario, governments enjoy a popular mandate for swift implementation -or stated in the negative: incumbent actors who called for the referendum could jeopardize their support if they delay the regulation and implementation. The new constitution scenario, we think, poses a less direct mandate, as external voting is discussed together with other issues the regulation of which takes priority and are perceived more important and urgent by political and civil society actors. As noted by Lafleur (2015) , plenty of countries have included external voting in their new constitutional texts, but failed to pass the regulation. Thus, we hypothesize that in countries that follow this procedure to enfranchise their non-resident citizens the enfranchisement process will be longer (H2b).
Finally, we hypothesize that in the ordinary constitutional amendment or legislative approval scenario the length of the enfranchisement process will depend on the level of consensus reached (H2c). If external voting is enacted by a small margin, the lag between enactment and application will be greater than if it is passed with a broad majority and cross-party support. Thus, our argument pushes us into considering the evolution of the degree of political contestation within the country. Two supplementary indicators are at hand: the effective number of political parties in the legislature, and the degree of fragmentation. We expect that the enfranchisement processes will extend with a higher number of political parties and higher fragmentation. In other words, a manageable number of political parties and political fragmentation could be a necessary condition for a short enfranchisement lag.
Figure XX. Main hypotheses
Source: own elaboration
Control variables
According to some authors, a diaspora's leverage towards their state of origin may be the sheer weight of their economic contribution. Yet, clearly no extension of voting rights occurs automatically due to remittances reaching a certain level. Rather, arguments are formulated by organized emigrant groups, civil society and political actors as to the reasons why voting rights are "owed" to the diaspora. These arguments might be strongly formulated to negotiate a rapid external enfranchisement process that sets an inclusive external voting system. Besides remittances (the economic weight of which we do consider for each case), other arguments touch upon different kinds of redress rationales from the state of origin towards its emigrants, for example, for past injustices which left people no other choice but to emigrate.
This is most plausible in the cases of political exile, but has also been elaborated by diasporas in the case of acute economic crises, poverty and discrimination.
Related to the arguments are, of course, the actors that elaborate them. Emigrant associations' pressure on legislators can be an important factor determining the length of the process of external enfranchisement. We expect that the lag between enactment and regulation and/or first application of external voting will be shorter in countries that have a well-organized diaspora than in countries with a rather demobilized diaspora. Additionally, the literature on external voting has also observed the influence of the development of a global norm regarding the acceptance of external voting (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010) . We argue that this could also have an impact on the length of the external enfranchisement process. Early adopters of external voting could have experienced lengthier processes than countries that adopted external voting more recently, when some international standards regarding external franchise have developed. Furthermore, we also expect that the countries that have extended electoral rights to non-residents gradually (i.e. consecutive enfranchisement) will be much more expedite in the regulation and application for the latter extensions of electoral rights. If a given country already has developed the regulation of external electoral rights and applied to at least one type of election, the regulation and application to other types of elections may pose less technical difficulties or political controversies.
CASE SELECTION
Previous research on external voting adoption has tested hypotheses by looking at countries that have enacted external voting (e.g. Lafleur 2015; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010) . This strategy, however, has not been effective to explain why countries that also met their hypothesized conditions for being candidates to external enfranchisement (i.e. democratization process, organized diaspora) did not extend electoral rights to non-residents. By considering enfranchisement a process that may lag and stale as our dependent variable we introduce more variation into the possible comparisons of enfranchisement processes: we analyze two countries where there is a relevant lag between enactment, regulation and first implementation (Mexico and Bolivia); and three countries without a lag (Argentina, Paraguay and Peru).
This allows us to test our hypotheses in cases of various outcomes (see Table XX ).
A second case selection criterion is diversity. We want to explore mechanism used to enact external voting. We study two countries that extended electoral rights to non-residents via an ordinary change in their legislation (Mexico and Argentina), two countries that did it with the introduction of a new constitution (Bolivia and Peru) and the one country that introduced external voting after a referendum (Paraguay) Finally, we include in our sample cases that adopted non-resident voting in a context of democratization (Argentina, Mexico and Peru) and countries that adopted after democracy was consolidated (Paraguay, Bolivia). consulates in 87 countries, after having voluntarily registered in a special register for voters abroad at least six months in advance of the election -a register which renews automatically for every election thereafter.
The votes are counted together with the votes of the electoral district in which the person last resided in Argentina, or according to the biographic connection of the voter's forefathers to Argentina.
Argentines abroad were enfranchised in November 1991 by Law 24.007. There was no lag in the adoption process, as the two necessary steps were swiftly accomplished within two years between approval and first application. Law 24.007 was approved of the third attempt, five years after the first law proposal to enfranchise emigrants was enacted 1 The first attempt of a proposal had been made in 1986; the second, in 1988. Both times, the proposals had gathered support in the Senate, yet had stranded in legislative limbo. From the time it was first proposed until the time it was enacted, the issue entered legislatures with majorities by UCR and later of PJ. In 1991 Argentina's Polity IV democracy score was 7, having recently experienced an episode of democratization with factionalism from 1983 -1989 (Marshall and Gurr 2016 . Bolivia, thus, is an example of a country that introduced external voting by means of amending its electoral law and for long failed to pass the secondary regulation due to the lack of consensus across political parties (H2c). In this regard, Bolivia shows the importance of the calculations by different political actors regarding the potential support that they might receive from abroad. The adoption process of external voting was only possible after it was included in the constitution of 2009, when the party in government gave it its full support and stroke a compromise with the opposition to limit the influence of the emigrant vote.
Figure X. External voting adoption process in Bolivia

Mexico
The enfranchisement of Mexican emigrants spans over a decade. The law that permitted Mexicans abroad to vote in general was passed in a package of electoral reforms in 1996 (González Martín, n.d., 36), widely recognized as pivotal to a process of democratization that had started three decades earlier (Merino 2003).
Yet, the regulation needed for the implementation of external vote was passed only after ten years and seven failed attempts in three legislatures.
That decade was a critical period in the Mexican transition to democracy. Peaceful alternation in the office of the President took place in its midst, in 2000. The difficult construction of a political consensus under changing regime and increasing competition seems a key as a factor that explains why the ordinary legislation (regulation) required before the implementation of the external vote took so long to materialize, even despite a low effective number of parties in the legislature throughout the period.
Having recently become a major transit country, Mexico' migration profile is nonetheless primarily defined by emigration. Still, in contrast to other countries in the Central America and Caribbean area the relative weight of remittances in the Mexican economy at large has barely ever reached a level equivalent to 3 per cent of the GDP, making it implausible to say that it depends on these cash inflows /remmittancedatainflowsoct2016, World Bank 2016). However, precisely in 1996 -when the external enfranchisement started-Mexico was the worlds' top receiver of remittances and debates around their symbolic importance held sway. Today it is only fourth in the world (IME 2016) and remittances still constitute an important source of its foreign currency income alongside oil exports and FDI. More importantly, perhaps, besides a numerous (at roughly 10 million in the late 1990s) and well-organized and highly mobilized diaspora, Mexico already had already created administrative organs with the mandate to establish links with and develop policies for the diaspora 6 at the start of the enfranchisement process.
Precisely for its importance as a case of emigrant policies, the Mexican external enfranchisement has been studied by many experts. Payán and Schober (2007, 153) considered 10 different variables to explain why only the eight initiative of regulation prospered. They concluded that the passage of the bill through the internal commissions in the parliament was decisive and had not been present in the earlier attempts. Since a trajectory of eight attempts extends from 1996 until 2006, a more detailed explanation is in line to trace several factors until it was finally approved in the 59 th legislature. The first obvious fact to note is the composition of the legislatures. Elected under the new electoral rules after the 1996 electoral reform, the legislatures that participated in this enfranchisement process were very different (57th -59th), but none had an absolute majority. This means thatall initiatives required negotiation and compromises.
The party that supported external voting most consistently (though not the only to propose it) was only the third force in these periods (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD).
Second, the constellation of actors in favor and against was mixed. Observers of the Mexican transition to democracy have highlighted the centrality of the establishment of an independent electoral authority with plenty of red tape to ensure transparent and reliable elections (Schedler 2001). While it is clear that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, which had held power in both executive and legislative powers of the nation since 1929, was generally against external voting due to its expectation that emigrants would vote against, it is less clear that the opposition of the new independent electoral authority was based on politics, as has been hypothesized by some. In a context of slowly expanding pluralism, much of the trust of political actors rested on the electoral authority's role as a guarantor of free and reliable elections. The worries expressed by that authority to guarantee that external votes could fit the same requirements as votes in Mexico (personal, free and secret) should not necessarily be read as an intention to restrict the participation. However, in his account of the enfranchisement process, Lafleur (2011, 487) notes also that enough voices against the external franchise remained within parties, even those in the opposition, so that no bloc positions could be observed in debates 7 . Regarding the pressure of migrant associations to legislate on this matter, Calderón Chelius' (2010), Ayón's (2010) and Lafleur's (2011) accounts all highlight mounting lobby efforts since the early 1990s. This pressure was potentiated by the executive office in order to push parties out of gridlock. The first president after peaceful democratic alternation, Vicente Fox, had praised emigrants as heroes since his campaign and promised to make sure that voting from abroad would become a reality.
Importantly, Payán and Schober consider the combinations of all these factors not as discrete attempts, but also as accumulating pressure over time until timing became a definitive factor pressing for agreement. In 2004 Fox instigated consultations between the three main political parties, the electoral authority and IME (which kept close track of each deputy's position and rose as a spokesperson of emigrants). These consultations were led by the Internal Ministry, whose goal was to get an agreement to pass the regulating law before the end of the term and in time for application in the elections of 2006. And yet, after these consultations, two other initiatives would still fail, which shows that even after legislators agreed, the details were important to negotiate still. In the end, however, time's pressure was stronger and no party wanted to be blamed for its failure so a large, expansive proposal of external vote regulation was Finally, is worth pointing out that during the military regime (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , Peruvian emigration was not as significant as in the following decades (Duran 2003, 171) . In this sense, it does not seem that the emigrant community or their remittances played a crucial role in external voting adoption process. In fact, during the Constitutional deliberations none of these issues were spoken about.
Figure X. External voting adoption process in Peru
Source: Own elaboration Table X summarizes the findings of the five case studies. The results show mix evidence regarding H1 (in periods of democratization, the length of the adoption process is abridged). Argentina, Peru and Bolivia are cases in point. Democratization can be crucial to shorten the process of adoption, from enactment to the first implementation. Mexico and Paraguay, however, refute H1. As described in the previous section, although it is true that in Mexico and Argentina the adoption of external voting ought to be framed within a democratization process, the long lag observed in both cases shows that democratization by itself cannot explain the length of the adoption process. The findings show stronger evidence regarding the hypothesis about the influence of the mechanism of adoption over the length of the time lag in the adoption process (H2). As we expected, there is an expedite application of external voting in Paraguay, where non-residents citizens were enfranchised after external suffrage was approved in a referendum (H2a). Peru introduced external voting with the enactment of a new constitution and it managed to complete the external adoption process in only one year. The evidence unveiled by this case shows that the adoption of external voting was more conditioned by the context of democratization (in line with H1), than by the legal mechanism of adoption or the mobilization of the emigrant community. In Mexico, the process of enfranchisement of emigrants lagged ten years after the general allowance of emigrant vote due to stepwise political rearrangements. Mexico shows strong supporting evidence of H2c in the sense that the course of ordinary legislation tends to take the longest, especially when embedded in a stepwise democratization process that lacks re-foundational stages such as new constitutions and where there is no strong and stable political majority in the legislative. Bolivia has revealed itself as a very alluring case of analysis. Its double adoption process offered a test of our hypotheses in two consecutive steps. The first process failed due to the lack of political consensus across political forces, as well as a weak electoral authority unable to enforce the clear mandate given by the electoral law. The second process shows how the obstruction of the opposition to external voting was avoided due to a strong support from the executive, as well as an increased external mobilization of the diaspora. Thus, Bolivia, when analyzing its first adoption process, shows evidence consistent with H2c:
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES
when external voting is enacted through a change in an ordinary law, the lack of political consensus holds back its regulation and application. The second process, however, shows how, despite the constitutional recognition of external voting, strong support from the president was key to the adoption process and to overcome the opposition blockade. This partially refutes H2b. Finally, the evidence from the Argentinian case somewhat supports H2c. It shows that, although external voting was introduced by a legislative change, the time lag was minimal due to an ample and stable legislative consensus around external voting.
Moreover, as Mexico and Bolivia, Argentina also shows how crucial the support of the president was to definitely conclude the adoption process.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The adoption of external voting has been often conceptualized as a one-time event. This paper, however, has proposed to analyze it as a dynamic process that extends over three different stages: enactment, regulation and application. We have argued that it is not only relevant to study why countries adopt external voting, but also to investigate how and when non-resident voting provisions are regulated and then implemented. We have first mapped the adoption process of external voting in 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Our analysis shows that there is a significant variation in the time that takes for some countries to transit from enactment to the regulation and actual application of external voting. There is a significant lag between enactment and application in 8 of the 15 countries that allow emigrants to participate in homeland elections. Our findings reveal interesting patterns as well. First, the significant lags are between the first and the second moment (i.e. enactment and regulation). Second, countries that simultaneously extended active and passive electoral rights to emigrants tend to present the shorter lags.
Although we focused -for reasons of space-on adoption of active electoral rights, the contribution of our paper to clarify stages of adoption becomes apparent when we observe passive electoral rights:
Remarkably, the countries that have regulated and applied external passive voting rights are also those with overall shorter process of active external voting adoption, but with regard to the various countries that simply removed residence restrictions to be a candidate confusion reigns in the literature as to whether that amounts to passive enfranchisement or not.
In order to explain the length of the lag between the three stages of the adoption of external voting we developed two main hypotheses. First, that the lag between stages will be shorter if the extension of electoral rights to emigrants happens in a general context of democratization. Second, we have suggested that the legal mechanism used to enact external voting (i.e. a new constitution, a referendum or a change in an ordinary law) matters. We have tested these two hypotheses studying five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru). Overall, the case studies show strong supporting evidence of the effect of the legal mechanism on the length of the adoption process. However, the findings regarding the democratization hypothesis are mixed, with supporting evidence for the cases of Argentina, Bolivia and Peru; but not for Mexico or Paraguay. To put it more clearly, it does not suffice to rely on the indicators of democratization indices, but it is necessary to look at the specific dynamics of political contestation as a regime opens. A factor which had not been raised by previous studies but which came up as relevant in our studies, and makes sense for the region we study, is the support from the presidential office. While not sufficient, the unabated support from the executive was a necessary factor in the cases we analyzed.
